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INTRODUCTION 
If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely 
in time destroy us. I am not prepared to accept this alternative . . . . 
[W]e must rehabilitate the drug user if we are to eliminate drug abuse 
and all the antisocial activities that flow form drug abuse.1 
The drug war has failed.  In the United States, 85% of inmates are 
“substance-involved.”2 Empirical evidence shows drug and alcohol 
abuse is a driving force behind a significant majority of the prison 
population arriving to these state-paid, iron-barred motels. Yet, 
annually the United States spends $81 billion in incarceration costs 
reacting to drug-addicted defendants by imposing ineffective criminal 
penalties.3  If we continue these misguided efforts, the wasted tax payer 
dollars will be miniscule compared to the thousands of lives lost 
through substance abuse related deaths and the depravation of freedom 
inside our prisons. 
In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a “War on Drugs,”4 in 
response to deteriorating neighborhoods and a five-fold increase in 
                                                          
1.  President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971) (transcript available at https://www.presid 
ency.ucsb.edu/node/240245).  
2.  Addiction, Substance Use and the Justice System, CTR. ON ADDICTION, 
https://www.centeronaddiction.org/newsroom/position-statements (last updated Apr. 
14, 2017) [hereinafter Addiction, Substance Use and the Justice System] (concluding 
that inmates are considered substance-involved if they “met the clinical criteria for 
addiction or substance abuse in the year prior to their arrest . . . had histories of illicit 
drug use or treatment for alcohol problems; were under the influences of alcohol or 
other drugs at the time of their crime; committed their offense to get money to buy 
drugs; were incarcerated for an alcohol or other drug law violation; or shared a 
combination of these characteristics”).   
3.  See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice 
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 817–18 (2017). 
4.  See Nixon, supra note 1 (highlighting how President Nixon’s use of the word 
“attack” six times in his speech reinforces the analogy that drugs are an aggressive 
enemy of the United States). Following President Nixon’s 1971 speech, the so-called 
“War on Drugs” became a popular name to describe the increased legislative efforts 
to tame the use of drugs and related violent crime in America. See A Brief History of 
the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-
history-drug-war (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (describing President Nixon’s declaration 
of the “War on Drugs” and the ensuing increase in “the size and presence of federal 
drug control agencies”). 
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narcotic deaths from 1960-70.5  President Nixon believed the economic 
principles of supply and demand apply equally to the drug world and 
emphatically stressed to Congress that targeting the supply of 
traffickers was not enough.6  As a result, Nixon advocated for a double-
edged approach to combatting the drug epidemic, which involved (1) 
snuffing out the demand for drugs by providing treatment for people 
who were drug addicts, and (2) working with international agencies to 
mitigate the supply.7  Additionally, Nixon recognized the irrefutable 
correlation between drug use and crime and directed his efforts toward 
investing money in rehabilitating people in the bondage of drug 
addiction.8 
 In the United States, each time the pendulum swings between 
political parties, the approach to penalties in the criminal justice system 
follows swiftly behind. Congress ping pongs between enacting more 
mandatory minimum penalties and abolishing mandatory minimum 
sentences, which are only to be resurrected in the future.9 Criminal 
justice policies also volley back and forth as a result of political party 
changes in executive departments. For example, during Barack 
Obama’s presidency, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a 
memorandum to all federal prosecutors reversing a policy that required 
prosecutors to bring charges with the most severe possible sentence.10  
Subsequently, during Donald Trump’s presidency, Attorney General 
                                                          
5. See id. (describing how narcotic related deaths in New York City increased 
from 200 deaths annually to over 1,000 from 1960 to 1970, demonstrating the rise of 
drug addiction in the United States at that time).  
6. See id. 
7. See id. (discussing the various sources of drug addiction in the United States 
during the rise of the War on Drugs and presenting potential solutions to combatting 
the sale and use of drugs). 
8. Id. 
9. See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 161–62 (New York: Basic 
Books ed., 2017) (presenting the historical interconnection between politics, power 
and crime, and how it fuels the “historical precedent for . . . [a] cyclical overreaction” 
to crime followed by more lenient policies). 
10. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Dep’t Policy on Charging & Sentencing (May 19, 2002), https://www.justice 
.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf 
(noting prosecutors should consider “an individualized assessment” of charges to 
ensure the charge fits with the unique circumstances of each defendant’s case). 
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Jeff Sessions sent a memorandum reversing the memorandum by 
Holder, and instead, directed prosecutors to “charge and pursue the 
most serious readily provable offense . . . including mandatory 
minimum sentences.”11 
Since the 1980s, criminal justice policy in the United States has 
been significantly more punitive.12 As a result of harsher sentencing 
policies, in the same time the United States’ population has grown by 
35%,13 the prison population has grown by 800%.14 It is evident that 
the pernicious policies implemented over the past forty years have been 
knee-jerk reactions to underlying societal issues such as drug 
                                                          
11.  Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t 
Policy on Charging & Sentencing (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/965896/download.  
12.  See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Countering Punitiveness: 
Understanding Stability in Canada’s Imprisonment Rate, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 325, 
326–27 (2006) (contrasting incarceration trends in Canada with the United States, by 
highlighting policies such as three-strikes sentencing, mandatory minimum penalties, 
habitual offender laws, and truth-in-sentencing, which are characterized as “evidence 
of increasing punitiveness”).  
13.  See Public Data, Population in the U.S., GOOGLE, https://www.google.com 
/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1uo9ude_&met_y=population&hl=en&dl=en (last 
updated Sept. 9, 2018) (reporting data from U.S. Census Bureau which found the 
population in the United States increased from 235.8 million in 1984 to 318.6 million 
in 2014, equating to a 35% population increase over thirty years).   
14.  160 CONG. REC. 6,489 (2014) (noting a statement from Senator Booker on 
the criminal justice system). “This Nation has seen this county have an 800[%] 
increase in the Federal prison system over the last 30 years.  Think about that—an 
800[%] increase.  We not have the very ignominious distinction of the globe for 
leading the planet Earth in a country that incarcerates its own citizens.  In fact, 
America is just 5[%] of the globe’s population, but we have 25[%] of the world’s 
imprisoned people, and I tell that is not because Americans have a greater proclivity 
for criminality, it is because our legal system is not a just system.” Id.; see also Letter 
from Thomas M. Susman, Director of Gov’t Aff., to Chairman Leahy & Ranking 
Member Grassley (Dec. 19, 2013) (on file with the American Bar Association), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013dec9_smart
ersentencingacts_l.pdf (finding the 790% increase in the federal prison population, 
occurring between 1980 and 2013, has been partly attributed to mandatory minimum 
sentences). 
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addiction,15 violent crime rates,16 and racism.17 In a congressional 
report, Congress admitted that mass incarceration has caused a serious 
economic burden and has taken an adverse toll on humanity.18 
Additionally, inmates with mental illness are disproportionately 
represented in the prison population.19  A common definition of insanity 
is doing the same thing over and over expecting different results.  The 
United States’ criminal justice policy shares this characteristic: 
Congress repeatedly enacts overly punitive mandatory sentences, 
expecting decreased crime rates after decades of failed results. If we 
treated these continuously failing criminal sentencing policies the same 
as repeat offenders, we would cease to have tolerance for them and put 
them behind bars for life.20  Ideally, policies are enacted to deter 
                                                          
15.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 751–
52 (2005) (discussing the use of a “get-tough” perspective on crime to soothe societal 
concerns about drug use). 
16.  See id. at 747 (explaining how politicians in the 1960s used public concern 
about violent crime to justify tough crime sentencing policies). 
17.  See 160 CONG. REC. 6,490 (2014) (“African Americans and Whites have 
no difference in drug usage whatsoever, but an African American who chooses to use 
marijuana is 3.7 times more likely to be arrested for that usage than someone who is 
White . . . [D]rug sentences for African-American men were 13.1[%] longer than 
those for White men.  Usage has no difference, but arrest rates are dramatically higher 
for African-American men.  In fact, for all crimes, when you start breaking the actual 
data down, you see patterns of discriminatory impact that are unacceptable in a nation 
this great.”).  
18.  See H. REP. NO. 115-699, at 23–24 (2018) (explaining the rising costs of 
the growing prison population is “becoming a real and immediate threat to public 
safety” and if the federal prison spending is not reduced, “there will continue to be 
fewer and fewer prosecutors to bring charges, fewer agents to investigate federal 
crimes, less support to state and local criminal justice partners, less support to 
treatment, prevention and intervention programs.. . .” (quoting the Department of 
Justice’s Criminal Division in 2013)).  
19.  See generally Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates 
and Probationers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS, (July 1999), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/mhtip.pdf 
(discussing the prevalence of incarcerated mentally ill individuals as of 1999). 
20.  See, e.g., id. (highlighting the prevalence of mentally ill individuals in 
prisons).  
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crime.21 They do not.22  Policies are enacted to lower crime rates.23 
They do not. Enacted policy aims to be proportionate and fair.24 It is 
not.25 With these concerns in mind, Congress will not achieve 
meaningful solutions to criminal justice policy by repeatedly 
implementing the same practices that produce minimal, if any, 
improvement. 
Since Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(“SRA”), which led to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(“Commission”), the use of parole to evaluate inmates’ rehabilitation 
was jettisoned.  Determinate confinement has become the default 
remedy for mental health issues and drug addiction.26  Mandatory 
minimum sentencing has historically been reserved for the most severe 
criminal offenses.27  However, currently there are over 170 federal 
provisions that include mandatory minimum sentences.28  The 
conversation about criminal justice reform has been exhausted for 
decades and, like many other political issues, is in a perpetual state of 
tug-of-war contingent upon which political party has the majority in 
Congress or Executive claim. The current criminal justice system 
requires unsustainable operation costs without a notable decrease in 
                                                          
21.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf 
[hereinafter USSG] (asserting the goal of criminal law is to punish and control crime). 
22.  See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4–5 (Jeremey Travis et al. 
eds., 2014) (concluding that the “incremental deterrent effect” of increasing prison 
sentences is “modest at best”). 
23.  USSG, supra note 21, at 4. 
24.  See id. at 3 (showing the goal of Congress is to allow the criminal justice 
system to produce fair and proportional in sentences). 
25.  See Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2015) (discussing drug sentences in practice may be longer 
than necessary to accomplish the underlying goals of “safety, justice, and 
deterrence”). 
26.  See Obama, supra note 3, at 821 (discussing the criminal justice system still 
serves as the automatic response to mental illness and drug addiction). 
27.  See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 114 (3rd ed. 2004) 
(explaining mandatory incarceration historically was the required sentence for crimes 
such as murder and driving while under the influence). 
28.  William K. Sessions III, Federal Sentencing Policy: Changes Since the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Evolving Role of the United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 85, 102.  
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crime rates.29  Unlike many other political issues, criminal justice 
reform has bipartisan support.30  Despite this united recognition for 
change, meaningful reform fails at the federal level and defies logic at 
every opportunity.31 
This Comment proposes the rehabilitative purpose of criminal 
penalties was abandoned for ill-advised reasons and the injustices the 
determinative model of sentencing aims to resolve have not come to 
fruition.  Shifting focus to rehabilitating drug-addicted defendants 
would not only meet all the purposes of criminal punishment, but would 
save an untold number of lives.  Part I aims to bring inherently flawed 
sentencing policies to justice by examining their evolution.  Part II will 
critically analyze how such policies have measured up to their purposed 
objectives.  Part III seeks to draw attention to the current costs and 
                                                          
29.  See, e.g., Micheal Tonry, Why Crime Rates are Falling throughout the 
Western World, in CRIME AND JUSTICE, WHY CRIME RATES FALL AND WHY THEY 
DON’T 5–6 (Michael Tonry ed., 2014) (noting that whatever causes crime rates to 
change, it is something other than changes in imprisonment rates and sentencing 
laws).  
30.  See, e.g., Obama, supra note 3, at 829 (discussing how recent criminal 
reform bills have received support from both Democrats and Republicans); see also 
Davis Richardson, As Private Prisons Surge Under Trump, Koch Brothers Launch 
Prison Reform Initiative, OBSERVER (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:02 PM), http://observer.com 
/2018/01/private-prisons-surge-koch-brothers-prison-reform-initiative/ (highlighting 
an emphasis on prison reform programs during President Trump’s term and noting 
that even the notorious right-wing billionaire Koch Brothers are backing reform). 
31.  See e.g., Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, H.R. 3382, 113th Cong. (died in 
Congress), reintroduced as Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. 
(died in Congress), reintroduced as Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th 
Cong. The Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014 passed in the Senate Judicial Committee 
with a 13-5 vote, but failed to get a favorable vote to pass through the Senate. John 
Malcom, The Case for the Smarter Sentencing Act, HERITAGE (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/the-case-the-smarter-
sentencing-act.  Despite broad support, the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014 was not 
brought the floor for a vote. S. 1410 (113th): Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410.  Republication majority house 
leader, Mitch McConnell, was concerned that if they voted on sentencing reform so 
close to an election, there could be Republican colleagues of his in Congress who 
would be vulnerable to their constituents. James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Why 
Criminal Justice Reform May Actually Get Done This Year- if These Two Hurdles 
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future repercussions of perpetuating these policies. Lastly, Part IV 
suggests a new approach to criminal justice policy that will decrease 
spending and most importantly, save lives.32 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Pre-Revolutionary War, the penalty for a felony was death and the 
penalty for a misdemeanor was public flogging and dismemberment.33  
Following the Revolutionary War, public opinion evolved considerably 
and society generally believed people were curable, capable, and 
deserving of rehabilitation.34  Fundamental in the rehabilitative 
approach to sentencing was the Quaker philosophy, which 
characterized social conditions as the cause of a crime and prisons as 
curative institutions.35 
A.  The Development of Indeterminate Sentencing and the 
Rehabilitative Model 
In the late 1800s, the rehabilitative model in criminal justice 
functioned under a two-fold approach to indeterminate sentencing.36 
First, judges used the “medical” sentencing model.37 Under this model, 
judges determined a “diagnosis” of an offender’s “condition” based on 
“any and all evidence” that was “relevant and necessary” (including 
offender life history) and sentenced offenders to an indeterminate term 
of imprisonment by establishing a maximum length of sentence.38  
Second, under the direction of the correctional institution, the 
offender’s  rehabilitation progress would dictate how long the offender 
                                                          
32.  See Obama, supra note 3, at 859 (characterizing drug abuse as a “public 
health problem”). 
33.  CAMPBELL, supra note 27, at 6–7. 
34.  United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 1989). 
35.  See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 
1039–40 (1991) (discussing that the Quakers viewed crime as the “product of society, 
rather than a result of inherent sinfulness”). 
36.  Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207.  
37.  Id.  
38.  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded 
Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 n.39 (2013).  
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stayed before being released back into society.39  Ultimately, a parole 
board decided whether an offender had been “reformed” and could be 
released.40 
Congress created the U.S. Parole Commission in 1948  and gave it 
the responsibilities of deciding federal parole releases and the 
conditions of those releases.41 In 1949, in Williams v. New York the 
Supreme Court echoed that rehabilitation was the proper purpose of 
confinement and sentences must be individualized in order to 
accomplish effective offender rehabilitation.42 In reaching their 
sentencing decisions, judges could consider the offenders’ individual 
characteristics, including the propensity for rehabilitation.43  However, 
opponents argued this indeterminate model was unfair because it could 
render inconsistent sentences when different offenders with the same 
criminal background commit the same offense.44  Under this model, 
sentences varied across federal districts.45 
The fallacy with critiquing inconsistent sentencing is this is 
precisely what should happen in a functioning system of individualized 
sentencing.  In these inconsistent cases, judges were not sentencing 
offenders based solely on offense and criminal history; rather, sentences 
were decided based on a variety of personalized factors.46  No two 
                                                          
39.  Id. at 8; see also Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207. 
40.   Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207; see also Parole Act of 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 
819, 819–21, repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1987 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (2006)).  
41.  See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218, repealed by Smarter Sentencing Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II § 218(a)(5), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2027.  
42.  Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1949).  
43.  Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment is Enough?: Embracing 
Uncertainty in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J. L. & POL’Y 345, 367 (2016). 
44.  See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Quest for Equality in Sentencing, 25 ISR. 
L. REV. 595, 595 (1991) (indicating the fundamental principles of consistency and 
fairness in sentencing were undermined during “half of the twentieth century . . . in 
the United States”).  
45.  See id. at 599, for a discussion of a study indicating the lack of consistency 
in sentences by fifty judges from the Second Circuit. 
46.  See id. at 596-97 (“[The] three interrelated concepts were the basic 
determinants of our sentencing law and practice: (1) That criminal sentences were for 
rehabilitation, not merely or mainly for punishment; (2) That sentences should 
therefore be indeterminate, permitting of suitable judgments as to when and whether 
rehabilitation had been accomplished; and (3) That sentences should fit the individual 
9
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sentences could be “consistent” when tailored to each offender’s 
individual characteristics and rehabilitation potential. Thus, sentences 
based on the crime charged and criminal history would inherently yield 
inconsistent sentences. 
B.  The Shift to Determinative Sentencing with a Punitive Purpose 
If locking up those who violate the law contributed to safer societies, 
then the United States should be the safest country in the world. In 
fact, the United States affords a glaring example of the limited impact 
that criminal justice responses may have on crime.47 
Robert Martinson’s What Works? Questions and Answers About 
Prison Reform is one of the most influential pieces of literature 
advocating for reform and opposing the rehabilitative model of 
sentencing.48  In the 1970s, Martinson published several studies that 
concluded the rehabilitative approach had no effect on recidivism.49 
Prior to Martinson’s findings, the medical model of sentencing was 
criticized by penological experts during the 1960s and 70s.50  These 
critics argued, as mentioned above, that indeterminate sentences were 
unjust because sentences were administered inconsistently across 
judicial districts.  Additionally, critics argued indeterminate sentences 
were ineffective because “[n]obody knows how to rehabilitate people 
in prison.”51  These critiques prompted a Congressional investigation  
                                                          
criminals, not merely or mainly the crime, and that sentences should, as a corollary, 
have broad sentencing discretion.”). 
47.  Twelfth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and 
the Solicitor General on Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy 2 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1993), http://preventingcrime.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015 
/05/HornerReport1993.pdf.  
48.  Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 43, at 371–72. 
49.  Id. at 371. 
50.  See generally Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers 
About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 35–36 (1974) (presenting various arguments 
against the medical model, specifically the ineffectiveness of using medical surgery 
and drugs alone to treat offenders); see also James R. Thompson & Gary L. Starkman, 
Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 152 (1974) (reviewing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)) (discussing Marvin Frankel’s 
thoughts about the inherent problem in the 1970s with awarding judges broad power 
and discretion to determine sentences for offenders). 
51.  Frankel, supra note 44, at 597.  
10
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on federal sentencing, which concluded the rehabilitative approach was 
impractical, and emphasized how little we know “about human 
behavior to . . . rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to 
determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been 
rehabilitated.”52 Consequently, with the enactment of the SRA, 
Congress shifted away from a rehabilitative approach toward a punitive 
one.53  The era of indeterminate sentencing and rehabilitation ended 
with disastrous results.54 Even worse, Martinson “subsequently 
retracted his earlier findings” as a result of his fully developed study that 
found rehabilitation does work, but this time his research was 
completely ignored.55 
In 1984, the Commission was established under the SRA and was 
responsible for promulgating sentencing guidelines.56 The sentencing 
guidelines were based on a determinate sentencing model.57 Under this 
model, offenders are sentenced to a determinate term of incarceration, 
and the need for the U.S. Parole Commission was abolished.58 During 
development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, drafters grappled 
with various perceptions of the purposes for criminal punishment.59 
Most agreed the ultimate goal is crime control.60 Secondary objectives 
were debatable.61 Some argued that punishment should be scaled to the 
                                                          
52.  Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1984), as 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223).  
53.  See id. at 1208 (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect 
the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the 
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 
(citing to 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(k) (West Supp. 1989)). 
54.  Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 43, at 373.  
55.  Id. at 378–79. 
56.  Saris, supra note 25, at 4; see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 3551 (LEXIS through Pub. 
L. No. 115–269). 
57.  See Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1208 (noting that under the determinate model 
of sentencing offenders were required to “serve the full length of [their] term”).  
58.  Id.  
59.  USSG, supra note 21, at 4. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. (“Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined primarily 
on the basis of the principal of ‘just deserts.’. . . Others argue that punishment should 
be imposed primarily on the basis of practical ‘crime control’ considerations.”). 
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offender’s culpability and resulting harm.62 Others argued punishment 
should be guided by the method most likely to effectively lessen the 
likelihood of future crime, by either deterring others or incapacitating 
the defendant.63 
C.  The Ebb and Flow of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Policy and 
the War on Drugs 
The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Congress’s first legislative 
response to drug crime, mandated lengthy minimum sentences for most 
drug importation and distribution offenses.64 Mandatory minimum 
sentences undermine justice by preventing prosecutors and judges from 
tailoring the punishment to the individual and the circumstances of their 
offense.65 The theory behind mandatory sentences is individuals are 
likely to be deterred from violating the law if there is a pre-determined 
length of sentence for specific violations.66 Subsequently, increasingly 
longer sentences failed to create the expected reduction in drug law 
violations.67 Additionally, some argued “severe penalties, which do not 
take into account individual circumstances and which treat casual 
violators as severely as they treat hardened criminals, tend to make 
convictions somewhat more difficult to obtain.”68 
These increasing concerns led to the passage of the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which repealed the 
statutory mandatory sentencing provisions for drug offenses.69 Then, 
                                                          
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  See Narcotics Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-728, tit. I, § 103 (1956).  
65.  CAMPBELL, supra note 27, at 114. 
66.  See id. at 114–23 (discussing underlying policies behind imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences). 
67.  See S. REP. NO. 91-613 at 2 (1969) (explaining longer criminal sentences 
do not necessarily reduce drug related crimes). 
68.  H.R. REP. NO. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 11 (1970) (discussing 
mandatory minimum sentences leading to a reluctance to prosecute some violations 
where the penalties are perceived to be disproportionate with the seriousness of the 
offense).  
69.  Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970); see also PFAFF, supra note 9, at 
162 (discussing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act in which 
Texas representative, George H. W. Bush, defended abolishing almost all the existing 
12
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the late 1980s and early 1990s saw an increase in drug use and violent 
crime.70 During this time, drug abuse was rated as the number one 
public concern.71 The consensus in Congress, in response to the 
concerns surrounding drug abuse, was that the United States was facing 
a national security crisis.72 Apparently law makers had amnesia about 
the minimal effectiveness mandatory minimum sentencing had on 
deterrence and fairness. 
Following the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.73  This new 
piece of legislation imposed harsh mandatory minimum penalties were 
imposed on drug traffickers.74  Ten-year mandatory minimum penalties 
were assigned to first time trafficker offenders, and twenty-year 
mandatory minimum sentence were given to repeat trafficker 
offenders.75  But two years after the Act’s passage, drug-related 
violence was still on the rise. Consequently, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to increase the existing mandatory penalties 
and add new ones.76 
When Congress enacted the SRA in 1984, the basic purpose was to 
“combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.”77  
Congress sought honesty, reasonable uniformity, and proportionality in 
sentencing.78 The SRA was designed to achieve these goals through a 
structured set of guidelines to help determine appropriate sentences.79  
                                                          
federal mandatory minimum for drug crimes and then as vice president and president 
he helped reintroduce and expand federal mandatory drug sentences). 
70.  Saris, supra note 25, at 3 (observing that the contributing factor to the 
increase in violent crime during that time was the sale of drugs). 
71.  William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing Sentencing Polices in a ‘War on 
Drugs’ Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 315 (1993). 
72.  See id. (detailing the “[g]laring headlines, dramatic footage . . . and regular 
[news] reports . . . chronicl[ing] various battles in the war on drugs” during the 1980s). 
73.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
74.  See generally id.  
75.  Pub. L. No. 99-570 § 1302(a)(1)(G). 
76.  See Wilkins, Jr. et al, supra note 71, at 316 (discussing Congress’ desire to 
“enact[] a number of new mandatory penalties and strengthen[] some that were 
already in place” in response to public safety concerns in the late 1980s).  
77.  USSG, supra note 21, at 3. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id.  
13
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As a result, the Commission was created to author the guidelines and to 
submit amendments to the existing guidelines.80 Originally, Congress 
envisioned the guideline-writing process to be evolutionary, achieved 
through continued research on the effectiveness of each guideline.81 
Then, the Commission could make modifications and revisions to the 
guidelines through the amendments to Congress.82 These amendments 
would automatically take effect 180 days after submission, unless a law 
was enacted to the contrary.83 The Commission relied upon empirical 
data to create these guidelines.84 Pre-guideline sentencing averages 
were used to establish offense values,85 but the guidelines departed 
from empirical data when required by federal statutes.86 If 
Congressional data exposed inconsistences in treatment for offenses 
with apparently equivalent behavior, it was departed from to fix any 
inconsistences.87 
Congress’s intent for the Sentencing Commission was to create an 
independent and expert agency, located within the Judiciary, that was 
answerable to all branches of government.88 The Commission is 
comprised of seven voting members and two non-voting members.89 
Additionally, there cannot be more than four members of the same 
political party and three of the members must be federal judges.90 The 
members are appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress for 
six-year staggered terms.91 The two non-voting members are the Chair 
                                                          
80.  Id. at 1.  
81.  Id. at 2. 
82.  Id.  
83.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). 
84.  USSG, supra note 21, at 5. 
85.  Id.  
86.  Id.; see, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-570. 
87.  USSG, supra note 21, at 5 (discussing that Congressional data revealed 
economic crimes were punished less severely than similarly equivalent behavior). 
88.  See id. at 13-14 (discussing the intent behind the creation of the 
Commission). 
89.  Id. at 1. 
90.  CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL, 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103.3 (West 
2018). 
91.  28 U.S.C. § 992(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1986).  
14
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of the United States Parole Commission and the Attorney General.92 In 
theory, the creation of the Commission was a progressive step forward. 
However, the Commission’s effectiveness has been selectively 
undermined by laws unsupported by empirical evidence, experience, or 
analysis.93 
D.  Tension Between Judicial, Congressional, and the Commission’s 
Power to Determine Drug Crime Sentencing 
Although Congress attempted to create a neutral body to make 
decisions on criminal sentencing, in practice, this body has not operated 
independently.  For example, two years after the Commission was 
created, Congress passed statutory mandatory minimum sentencing for 
drug and firearms offenses with penalties often exceeding the penalties 
in the guidelines, resulting in inconsistency between the Commission’s 
prescribed penalties and the federal statute.94  These mandatory 
penalties were in “conflict both in practice and spirit with a guideline 
system.”95  The impact of these incongruent directives is longer 
sentences and an increase in other penalties in the guidelines to avoid 
“cliffs” between the Commission’s guidelines and Congress’s statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences.96 As stated by a former Chair of the 
Commission, William K. Sessions III, “Some directives have been 
appropriate reflections of congressional oversight that highlighted 
general policy concerns, while others invaded the detailed work of the 
Commission.”97  As a result, the Commission felt obligated to add 
                                                          
92.  Organization, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-
are/organization (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
93.  See Sessions III, supra note 28, at 102 (pointing to the Commission’s 
reports on sentencing disparities as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the SRA, which 
was enacted to “reduce unwanted disparities in sentencing”); see also Joe B. Brown, 
The Need to Educate Congress About Mandatory-Sentences, 8 FED. SENT. R. 18, 18 
(1995) (noting that “Congress clearly intended in 1984 that the Commission have real 
input and control over sentence length, but the overuse of mandatory sentences has 
made Commission control ineffective”).   
94.  See Session III, supra 28, at 93. 
95.  Id.  
96.  Id.  
97.  Id. at 94.  
15
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additional aggravating factors, which increased penalties to deter 
Congress from enacting additional mandatory minimum penalties.98 
During the war on drugs, the statutory penalties for crack cocaine 
as opposed to powder cocaine were increased by a ratio of 100 to 1.99 
However, these penalties were inherently discriminatory.100 The late 
Harvard criminal law professor, William J. Stuntz, opinioned, 
“Persistent bias occurred with respect to the contemporary enforcement 
of drug laws where, in the 1990s and early 2000s, blacks constituted a 
minority of regular users of crack cocaine but more than 80% of crack 
defendants.”101  In United States v. Blewett, the Sixth Circuit  held, “the 
federal judicial perpetuation of the racially discriminatory mandatory 
minimum crack sentences for those defendants sentenced under the old 
crack sentencing law . . . would violate the Equal Protection Clause . . . 
. “102  Since then, these racially motivated laws have been amended by 
the Fair Sentencing Act.103  As a result of this amendment, the current 
penalty for crack, as opposed to powder cocaine, is now an 18 to 1 
ratio.104  However, the Fair Sentencing Act was not applied 
retroactively.105  This means there are thousands of inmates sentenced 
prior to the Fair Sentencing Act who are required to remain incarcerated 
to complete these unjust sentences.106 
When Congress enacted these racially biased statutory penalties for 
crack cocaine, the Commission advocated for an amendment and issued 
                                                          
98.  Id. Aggravating factors are facts or circumstances that increase the severity 
or culpability of a criminal act, which can include: recidivism, lack of remorse, 
amount of harm to the victim, committing the crime in front of a child. 
99.  Id.  
100.  See United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir.) (discussing the 
unfair impact of the Fair Sentencing Act on racial minorities), vacated, 746 F.3d 647 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
101.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 184 (2011)).  
102.  Id.  
103.  See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 
(codified at scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.). 
104.  Blewett, 719 F.3d at 484. 
105.  Id. 
106.  See id. at 484–85 (reporting that 30,000 inmates were serving out crack 
sentences in 2011, which is 15% of the federal prison population). 
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a report to Congress recommending the penalties be “equalized.”107 
“For the first and only time in history,” Congress rejected the 
Commission’s suggested amendment to a statutory penalty.108  
Congress failed to consider the suggestion of the Commission, which is 
the expert body Congress created for the specific purpose of ensuring 
federal sentencing is fair and proportional.109  Further, Congress 
declined to reappoint any of the commissioners who suggested this 
particular amendment, and within a couple years the Sentencing 
Commission had no remaining commissioners.110 
Today, the Commission has four open seats. President Trump has 
recently announced four nominees to the Commission, including 
William Otis.111  Otis has been the leading opponent of bipartisan 
criminal justice reform for years.112  Another nominee, Judge Henry E. 
Hudson, is an infamously “tough-on-crime judge,” nicknamed “Hang 
‘Em High” Henry.113 If confirmed by the Senate, these nominees will 
most likely perpetuate outdated beliefs about sentencing and will make 
sentencing reform extremely difficult. 
Congressional mandatory minimum sentences and the 
Commission’s specific directives from Congress undermine the 
congressional intent of the Sentencing Commission in two ways: (1) the 
mandatory minimum sentences, which increase penalties, are 
implemented without the support of any empirical research negating the 
Commission’s ability to set justified sentences, and (2) the 
Congressional directives undermine the Commission’s ability to act as 
the expert body in the field of sentencing, preventing the Commission 
                                                          
107.  Sessions III, supra note 28, at 94-5. 
108.  Id. at 95 (noting this rejected amendment also included an accompanying 
amendment for money laundering).  
109.  Id.; see also USSG, supra note 21, at 6 (discussing the Commission’s 
desire to achieve a “more honest, uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore 
effective sentencing system”). 
110.  Sessions III, supra note 28, at 95. 
111.  Statement on Nomination of William Otis to U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
FAMM (Mar. 1, 2018), http://famm.org/famm-statement-on-nomination-of-william-
otis-to-u-s-sentencing-commission/.  
112.  See id. (observing “Mr. Ottis’s outdated views” and urging the Senate to 
reject him as a candidate). 
113.  Charles Fain Lehman, Trump Announces Tough-on-Crime Nominees to 
Sentencing Commission, FREE BEACON (Mar. 2, 2018, 3:55 PM), http://freebeacon. 
com/issues/trump-announces-tough-crime-nominees-sentencing-commission/.  
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from fulfilling its intended role.114  However, the Commission is not the 
only body of experts who have lost the power to regulate sentencing.  
Judges have traditionally been tasked with considering a defendant’s 
the history and characteristics, along with the nature and circumstances 
of the offense, when selecting an appropriate sentence.115  However, a 
judge’s ability to decide what sentence is “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary” is frustrated by mandatory statutory sentencing terms 
and the guidelines created by the Commission.116  As a result, judges 
often depart from the guidelines when necessary to “mitigate 
unwarranted sentencing harshness.”117  In response, Congress enacted 
the PROTECT Act of 2003, to combat the quickly increasing number 
of judge-initiated “downward departures” by requiring the Attorney 
General to report such departures to Congress.118 Also, the PROTECT 
Act amended the SRA’s “minimum” requirement of three federal 
judges, on the seven-member Commission, to a “maximum” of three 
federal judges, to reduce judge’s discretionary power.119 
E.  How Punitive Are Mandatory Minimum Sentences? 
In the United States, many people are uneducated about how 
punitive sentencing penalties have become. The Commission’s data 
from 2016 reveals that the average sentence length of offenders, 
sentenced under the mandatory minimum penalty, was 138 months; this 
staggering figure is over twice the average sentence of offenders who 
were not subjected to the mandatory minimum penalty.120 The 
Commission also found the average sentence for offenders not 
                                                          
114. Sessions III, supra note 28, at 104. 
115. U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
116. See generally id. at § 3553(a) (discussing what factors should be 
considered by judges when determining an appropriate sentence). 
117. See Skye Phillips, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and the 
Executive’s Intrusion into Judicial Independence, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 947, 1011 (2004).  
118. See Sessions III, supra note 28, at 95-96 (detailing the impact of the 
PROTECT ACT of 2003 on federal sentencing). 
119. Id. at 96.  
120. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS ON MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2016), https://www.ussc. 
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Mand 
_Mins_FY16.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS]. 
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convicted of any offense, sentenced under the mandatory minimum 
penalty, was twenty-eight months.121  This data suggests Congress’s 
statutory mandatory minimums have influenced guideline increases, 
resulting in sentences twice the length recommended by the 
Commission. 
However, there are a couple ways an offender can escape a 
mandatory term: (1) an offender who has case-related information to 
provide the government, which helps the government in a substantial 
way, or (2) an offender with no prior criminal history (safety valve 
provision).122 Based on the Commission’s data from 2016, almost 40% 
of offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
sentence were able to evade the mandatory minimum penalty, of that 
percentage: 18.8% received relief by providing the government with 
substantial assistance; 14.3% received relief solely through the 
statutory safety valve provision; and 5.5% received relief through the 
statutory safety valve provision and by providing substantial assistance 
to the government.123  Therefore, 60% of offenders convicted of crimes 
carrying a mandatory sentence are unable to escape the mandatory 
minimum penalty and remain subjected to that penalty at sentencing. 
Currently, approximately 13.5% of federal offenders are serving 
mandatory minimum sentences.124  Consequently, almost 14% of 
federal offenders are spending twice as long in prison than the 
guidelines would have suggested necessary to fulfill the sentencing 
purpose. Some sentencing judges are forever haunted by cases that were 
deserving of exceptions to the statutory penalty, but their discretion was 
                                                          
121.  Id.  
122.  See S. 1933: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2017, 115th Congress (2017), 
FAMM (Apr. 27, 2018), https://famm.org/s-1933-smarter-sentencing-act-2017-
115th-congress/ [hereinafter Smarter Sentencing].  The “safety valve” is a sentencing 
relief tool limiting the use of mandatory minimum sentences related to drug offenses 
when the defendant does not have any history of violence, only one criminal history 
point, played a minor role in the offense, and the offense did not result in serious 
bodily injury or death. See generally id.  
123.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS, supra note 120.  
124.  Id.  
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thwarted by Congress.125  As a result. mandatory sentences are a major 
contributing factor to the national mass incarceration crisis.126 
F.  Second Class Citizens: The Continued Oppression of Collateral 
Consequences 
Frequently, the end of an overly punitive sentence is just the 
beginning of the perpetual oppression an individual convicted of a 
crime will face.  States impose a significant number of collateral 
consequences upon those convicted of crime.127 Collateral 
consequences are “federal and state civil laws and regulations that 
restrict the activities” of people with a prior criminal conviction.128  
There are 70 million Americans with some form of criminal record.129  
Since the mid-1980s, the number of state imposed collateral 
consequences has expanded dramatically.130  Some estimates figure 
that today’s ex-offenders could face up to “50,000 legally mandated 
collateral consequences, including, restrictions on housing, 
employment,  public benefits, and immigration.”131 Moreover, twelve 
                                                          
125.  See CAMPBELL, supra note 27, at 121 n. 38 (discussing U.S. District Court 
Judge W. Schwarzer’s experience being denied the ability to rule “justly” due to 
mandatory sentencing guidelines). “The law denies the judges to bring to bear their 
conscience and their sense of what is just, and, in a sense, makes judges clerks—or, 
not even that, computers, automatically imposing sentences without regard to what is 
just and right. And when that is allowed to happen, the rule of law is drained of the 
semblance of justice.” Id. (citing L.A. TIMES, B1 (29 January 90)); see also  Byron 
Pitts, Jackie Jesko & Lauren Effron, Former Federal Judge Regrets 55-Year 
Marijuana Sentence, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:14 PM), http://abcnews. 
go.com/US/federal-judge-regrets-55-year-marijuana-sentence/story?id=28869467 
(detailing a retired Utah federal judge’s remorse over a sentence that he felt “the 
system forced [him] to do”). 
126.  CAMPBELL, supra note 27, at 121. 
127.  See John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral 
Consequences, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 36, 36 (2018) (exploring collateral 
consequences in the United States). 
128.  Id.  
129.  Obama, supra note 3, at 815. 
130.  Malclom, supra note 127, at 36. 
131.  Lorelei Laid, Doing Time Extended Ex-Offenders Face Tens of Thousands 
of Legal Restrictions, Bias and Limits on Their Rights, 99 A.B.A. J. 50, 55 (2013); see 
also 160 CONG. REC. 6,489-90 (2014) (“We now live in a nation where the collateral 
consequences are profound.  We know that time behind bars, even for these nonviolent 
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states permanently disenfranchise convicted felons from societal 
privileges.132  Imposing collateral consequences on convicted persons 
impedes their forward progress and breeds recidivism. 
II.  ASSESSMENT OF PRESCRIBED OBJECTIVES AND THEIR RESULTS 
In the United States, it has been thirty-four years since the 
migration from the rehabilitative approach to the punitive approach in 
criminal sentencing. Over the past three decades, data has been 
collected about many different aspects of sentencing.  Consequently, an 
informed assessment can be made about the effectiveness of sentencing 
by using the data on inconsistent sentencing policies.  This compilation 
of data reveals how adequately, or inadequately, the policies have 
measured up to the intended goals. 
A.  Sentencing Purpose #1: Crime Prevention 
After the implementation of mandatory sentencing in the 1980s, 
any reduction in the crime rate was not attributed to increased 
incarceration and longer sentences were deemed an ineffective 
approach to preventing crime.133 In response to this understanding of 
crime prevention, in 2007 the Commission reduced sentence disparities 
between crack and powder cocaine by twenty-seven months and 
eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of 
crack cocaine.134  Then, in 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing 
                                                          
offenders, reduces . . . their annual earnings by 40 percent. [] If a person is convicted 
for possession of controlled substances use, they become ineligible for so many 
benefits that we would often think we would want these very people to have. [] Former 
inmates can’t get jobs, shelter, or loans. They often feel that no option exists other 
than going back to that slippery slope toward more crime.”). 
132.  See Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates 
of Felony Disenfranchisement,2016, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 4 (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-
estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ (discussing how in “extreme cases” states 
will completely deny voting rights even to inmates who have completed their prison, 
probation or parole sentence). 
133.  See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 342 (finding that research 
shows longer sentences does not reduce crime or deter crime).  
134.  Obama, supra note 3, at 826-27. 
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Act which aided the Commission in further “reduc[ing] the sentencing 
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. . .”135 
Following these changes, the Commission conducted a study over 
a five-year period on crack cocaine offenders who had their sentences 
reduced by 20% as a result of this policy amendment.136  The study 
compared the recidivism rates between crack cocaine offenders who 
served their entire sentence and crack cocaine offenders who served 
only 80% of their sentence.137  There was no statistically significant 
difference in rates of recidivism or plea rates between these two 
groups.138  In fact, the only two factors that presented any significant 
data for higher recidivism rates were related to youthfulness and higher 
past criminal history.139  Even more astounding was the revelation that 
32% of “state prison inmates reported being high on drugs at the time 
of their crime, and 17% committed their [convicted] crime to get money 
to buy drugs.”140  Therefore the Commission’s study revealed three 
common characteristics of individuals who have a propensity to be 
repeat offenders: (1) age, (2) increased pattern of prior criminal activity, 
and (3) drug-addiction. 
Therefore, with these factors in mind, an effective crime prevention 
tool is to implement criminal justice policies tailored to the offender’s 
individual characteristics and propensities.  For example, more focus 
should be spent on empowering individuals who enter the criminal 
justice system at a young age. This can be accomplished by providing 
the younger criminal population with tools and support to prevent a life-
long dependency on the incarceration system.  Another possible 
                                                          
135.  Id. at 827; see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 
Stat. 2372 (codified at scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).  
136.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Recidivism Among Offenders Receiving 
Retroaction Sentence Reductions: The 2007 Crack Cocaine Amendment 1 & 14 (May 
2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/20140527_Recidivism_2007_Crack_ 
Cocaine_Amendment.pdf (discussing a study on recidivism rates for offenders who 
had their sentences reduced due to the 2007 Crack Cocaine Amendment). 
137.  Id. at 14.  
138.  Id. at 14–15 (concluding the study indicated offenders who completed 
their entire sentence and offenders who only completed 80% of their sentence had 
similar rates of re-offending); see also Saris, supra note 25, at 14 (finding “plea rates 
for crack offenders” were the same even after “sentences were lowered.”). 
139.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 136, at 15.  
140.  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 134.  
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solution is to rehabilitate offenders while they are incarcerated and to 
provide adequate re-entry services when offenders are released. This 
focus on rehabilitation could decrease the number of repeat offenders, 
while functioning as a crime prevention tool. Lastly, rehabilitating 
drug-addicted offenders would be an effective way to deter future crime 
because these offenders often resort to committing additional crimes. 
B.  Sentencing Purpose #2: Deterrence 
Deterrence is an important policy consideration aimed at reducing 
incarceration in the United States.141  The deterrence theory is a 
rationalistic one.142  Under this theory, the “individual considering 
commission of a crime weighs the benefits of offending against the 
costs of punishment.”143 For deterrence to be effective, individuals 
must have “some knowledge of  criminal penalties” imposed for 
committing a crime, in practice, however individuals usually do not 
have access to this type of information.144 
This sentencing theory—that “certainty of punishment [is] a more 
effective deterrent to criminal conduct than severity of punishment”—
was first introduced after the Revolutionary War.145  This theory is still 
relied on by many today.  For instance, scholars analyzed the deterrent 
effect of California’s third-strike provision in a study on incarceration 
as a deterrence to crime and whether sentence enhancements resulted 
in a greater deterrence; however this study found only a modest 
deterrent effect.146 Another study examining the deterrent effect of 
prison sentence enhancements for gun crimes also demonstrated no 
effect on deterrence.147  Lastly, a study examining the “heightened 
                                                          
141.  See id. at 132 (discussing that under the “theory of deterrence, crime is 
averted when the expected costs of punishment exceed the benefits of offending”). 
142.  Id. at 133. 
143.  Id.  
144.  Id. 
145.  Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1206. 
146.  Eric Helland et al., Does Three Strikes Deter? A Non-Parametric 
Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 309, 309 (2007). 
147.  See Jens Ludwig & Steven Raphael, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The 
Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND 
VIOLENCE 252 (Philip J. Cook & Jens Judwig, eds. 2003) (discussing Project Exile, a 
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threat of imprisonment . . . under the jurisdiction of adult courts at the 
age of majority . . .” again found no deterrent effect.148  Other studies 
demonstrate mandatory minimum sentences do not deter future crime 
and, in some instances, actually raise the risk of recidivism for certain 
offenders.149 Therefore, increasing criminal penalties is not an effective 
mechanism to deter future crime. 
There are countless studies confirming certainty of punishment is a 
deterrent.150  This is one of the reasons that offenders in diversion 
programs are so successful.151  Offenders participating in a diversion 
program know violating a diversion program rule or law results in 
incarceration, and the inability to avoid their sentence or conviction. 
Moreover, the congressional idea that mandatory minimum penalties 
help to ensure “certainty of punishment”152 is negated by research that 
shows a majority of the public does not have knowledge of the precise 
statutory penalties.153 
                                                          
program created to reduce gun-related deaths, which was found to have little effect on 
decreasing death rates). 
148.  See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 136–37 (discussing a study 
conducted by Lee and McCrary in 2009 which looked at “individual crime histories 
in Florida to see whether felony offending declines sharply at age 18,” concluding a 
“very small and not statically significant” decline). 
149.  See Lin Song & Roxanne Lieb, Recidivism: The Effect of Incarceration 
and Length of Time Served, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y 6 (Sept. 1993), 
http://wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1152/Wsipp_Recidivism-The-Effect-of-
Incarceration-and-Length-of-Time-Served_Full-Report.pdf (reporting on a study 
from 1988 which revealed burglary and robbery offenders in Carolina prison in 1980 
who were incarcerated for more than 1.2 years “had an increased risk of recidivism”).  
150.  See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 29, 28–29 (observing that “certainty and 
promptness of punishment are more powerful deterrent than severity,” which was 
confirmed by “three National Academy of Science panels . . . [and] every major 
survey of the evidence.”). 
151.  Letter from Ronald H. Levine & Knut S. Johnson, to the Hon. William H. 
Pryor, Response to Request for Comment on Proposed 2017-2018 Priorities 16 (July 
31, 2017) (on file with the Practitioners Advisory Group) [hereinafter PAG]. 
Diversion programs are deferred adjudication programs that give nonviolent felony 
offenders with little or no criminal history tools such as behavior modification, job 
skills, education, and community service to redirect the offender out of the criminal 
justice system. See generally id. 
152.  Sessions III, supra note 28, at 103. 
153.  See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME 
& JUST. 199, 204 (2013) (noting “[n]umerous surveys have been conducted” 
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In other words, people cannot make the conscious choice to refrain 
from crime due to severe penalties if they are ignorant to what the 
penalties are.  Thus, the public needs to have knowledge of what the 
potential criminal penalties are to decide if the penalty is worth the risk 
of the crime.  A more effective way to deter crime is to have a higher 
percentage of offenders in diversion-like programs where they have a 
certainty of punishment if they violate any rules or laws.  In turn, 
immediate incarceration would be reserved for the most egregious 
violations of the law. 
C.  Sentencing Purpose #3: Incapacitation 
Another enumerated goal of sentencing is incapacitation.154  The 
goal of incapacitation is to remove the individual from the society that 
he or she offended through incarceration, thereby protecting the 
community from additional harm the individual may cause.155  Since 
the imposition of excessively long sentences, scholars have conducted 
research about the effect incapacitation has on keeping dangerous 
people off the street.  Scholars have found that incapacitation for the 
purpose of protecting the community becomes less effective as 
prisoners get older, because older offenders are less likely to cause 
additional harm.156  In alignment with this finding, the Commission also 
conducted a study on recidivism and analyzed what factors increase or 
decrease recidivism.157  The Commission found that the length of 
incarceration has little impact on rates of recidivism.158  In fact, 
sentences that were longer than six months showed minimal changes in 
                                                          
examining the public’s lack of knowledge of penalties and legal consequences 
associated with certain actions). 
154.  USSG, supra note 21, at 5. 
155.  Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist 
Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017).  
156.  Saris, supra note 25, at 12. 
157.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N , RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 22 (Mar. 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/recidivism_overview 
.pdf (discussing the “highest recidivism rates are generally found among offenders 
with longer sentences” but the lowest rate of recidivism was found in offenders 
serving “supervised release of ten years or more”). 
158.  See id. (finding rate of recidivism for sentences ranging from six months 
to ten years or more were all within 50% to 52%). 
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the rates of recidivism;159 whether someone served two years or nine 
years, the recidivism rate was virtually the same.160 Thus, longer 
sentences do not reduce the likelihood that an offender is going to re-
offend in the future, which is what incapacitation aims to prevent. 
Instead, longer sentences lose their beneficial impact as time passes. 
D.  Sentencing Purpose #4: Proportionality and Fairness 
In the early 1980s, there was a shift from the indeterminate model 
of sentencing to a determinate model, due to the concern that the 
indeterminate sentencing model resulted in inconsistencies.161 
However, since the shift to determinate sentencing, the results have 
been anything but proportionate, fair sentencing.162  For example, in 
2011, the Commission released a large-scale study of federal mandatory 
minimum penalties, which revealed that mandatory minimum penalties 
for drug offenses were “too severe and applied too broadly.”163  The 
report also found that these penalties result in inconsistent sentencing; 
the precise inequity the guidelines attempt to mitigate.164 
 One practical limitation of the determinate model for sentencing is 
many of the harsh penalties reserved for drug crime offenders are 
applied to the wrong level of offender.  For example, if the main 
distributer and trafficker of drugs complied with the government and 
provided useful information, they would get a shorter sentence 
compared to a mere drug distributor who does not have any information 
to provide to the government because of their actual lack of enterprise 
knowledge. 
                                                          
159.  See id. (concluding rates of recidivism for these sentences only differed 
by less than 2%). 
160.  Id. 
161.   Saris, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing the shift in sentencing ideologies in 
the 1980s due to concerns about “glaring disparities” in sentences). 
162.  PAG, supra note 151, at 1. 
163.  Saris, supra note 25, at 12; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 345, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congress 
sional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chap 
ter_12.pdf.  
164. See Saris, supra note 25, at 12 (finding in depending on the district some 
prosecutors use “procedure[s] . . .  that double mandatory minimum sentences if there 
is a prior conviction” and other “prosecutors do not use them at all”). 
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For certain particularly severe penalty provisions, like the procedure 
detailed in 21 U.S.C. § 851 that doubles the mandatory minimum if 
there is a prior conviction, the Commission found that in some 
districts, prosecutors use them regularly, while in others, prosecutors 
do not use them at all . . .. Many in Congress emphasized the 
importance of these penalties for targeting kingpins and high-level 
members of drug organizations . . . [but] [t]he category of offenders 
most often subject to mandatory minimum penalties at the time of 
sentencing were street-level dealers—many levels down from 
kingpins and organizations.165 
Therefore, to increase proportionality and fairness in sentencing, 
flexible sentences, such as less severe mandatory minimums, should be 
applied.  The current, “one-size-fits-all” mandatory minimum sentences 
make the underlying goal of sentencing, proportionality and fairness, 
unattainable. If sentencing judges sentenced based on individual 
culpability, rather than other factors such as drug quantity, the result 
would be the ability to “promote proportionality and reduce 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.”166 
III.  NATIONAL EMERGENCY: OPIOID CRISIS 
The current opioid epidemic has permeated throughout the United 
States like a ravenous predator.  This crippling societal issue mirrors 
the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s.  Since 2011, drug overdose 
fatalities have surpassed every other cause for injury or death in the 
United States.167  More people die annually from drug overdoses than 
by gun violence, homicide, suicide, and car accidents.168  In 2015 the 
number of deaths from drug overdose was 52,404, which is 
approximately 140 people per day.169 
Drug users often commit crimes, such as theft and selling drugs, to 
get money to buy drugs, resulting in drug users committing crimes at a 
                                                          
165.  Id. at 12–13. 
166.  PAG, supra note 151, at 1.  
167.  DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG 
TREATMENT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY (2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files 
/2018-07/DIR-040-17_2017-NDTA.pdf. 
168.  Id.  
169.  Id.  
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much higher rate to fuel their drug addiction.170  The pervasive 
influence of drug addiction is usually the catalyst that brings most 
people into the criminal justice system.171  As a result, 85% of prison 
and jail inmates are classified as “substance abuse involved” for the 
following reasons: 
[They] met the clinical criteria for addiction or substance abuse in 
the year prior to their arrest . . .  had [a] histor[y] of illicit drug use 
or treatment for alcohol problems; were under the influence of 
alcohol or other drugs at the time of their crime; committed their 
offense to get money to buy drugs; were incarcerated for an alcohol 
or other drug law violation; or shared a combination of these 
characteristics.172 
Currently in the United States, almost half a million people are in 
prison for drug related offenses.173 As a result of this staggering 
statistic, the Department of Justice’s budget to house prisoners has 
tripled in the last decade, depleting funds for successful re-entry and 
rehabilitation programs.174  Despite evidence indicating massive levels 
of incarceration have not made society safer, the United States 
continues to spend $80 billion of tax payer money to confine prisoners 
every year.175  Drug offenders account for 46% of the federal prison 
population.176  The cost to house one nonviolent drug offender for a 
                                                          
170.  See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 133-34 (discussing the 
influence of personality traits and drug addiction on “self-control” and crime).  
171.  See generally id. at 134.  
172.  Addiction, Substance Use and the Justice System, supra note 2. 
173.  See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole 
Pie 2017, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy. 
org/reports/pie2017.html (observing more than two million individuals are 
incarcerated in the U.S. and 20% of incarcerated individuals are serving time for a 
drug related crime). 
174.  Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deputy Attorney 
General Sally Q. Yates Delivers McNamara Memorial Lecture at Fordham University 
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-
q-yates-delivers-mcnamara-memorial-lecture-fordham. 
175.  See Obama, supra note 3, at 815 (reporting annual costs of incarceration 
and noting a third of adults in the U.S. have “some form of criminal record.”). 
176.  Inmate Statistics: Offenses, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop 
.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Oct. 27, 2018).  
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mandatory sentence of ten years exceeds $300,000.177  The cost to 
rehabilitate offenders through treatment programs, rather than 
confinement, is “a fraction of the cost.”178  These treatment programs 
offer offenders the necessary tools to develop into law-abiding citizens 
who can learn to contribute to society and pass on these skills to 
members of their family and the community.179  Punitive policies over 
the last forty years have only increased the prison population and have 
done little to address the underlying causes and remedies for drug 
addiction.180  The focus needs to turn toward funding resources that 
extinguish the demand for drug and/or alcohol use. Rehabilitating 
offenders is the most effective way to keep people from going back to 
prison and to fight crime. 
IV.  FREE THE PRISONERS OF WAR 
A.  Federal Sentencing Reform Bills and Their Effect 
Congressional statutes got us into this mess. The good news is that 
they can also get us out. One fundamental stronghold of the 
governmental structure in the United States is to ensure just policies are 
executed by checks and balances between the branches of government.  
Currently, prosecutors have the sole power to decide whether to bring 
charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences, and judges cannot 
police this power.181  Due to mandatory sentencing statutes enacted by 
Congress, the power to determine an appropriate sentence has been 
taken out of the hands of judges and parole boards, and placed into the 
hands of prosecutors. This is an ill-fated direction for sentencing policy 
and contravenes the fundamental principles of our governmental 
structure. 
                                                          
177.  See NATHAN JAMES, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 9 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf 
(concluding the costs of incarceration for one year is around $30,000 per inmate). 
178.  See Obama, supra note 3, at 860. 
179.  Drug Court: Frequently Asked Questions, SAN DIEGO CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, 
http://www.sdcda.org/files/Drug%20Court.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
180.  See Sessions III, supra note 28, at 88–89 (discussing the “historical 
underpinnings” of sentencing). 
181.  Justice Safety Valve Act: S. 1127/H.R. 2435, 115th Congress, FAMM, 
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/JSVA-Factsheet-115th.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 
2018). 
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However, the Justice Safety Valve Act, if passed, can fix the current 
misguided sentencing structure.182 This bill will give judges authority 
to determine the appropriate sentence for defendants.  However, the 
judges’ authority will be checked by prosecutors because a judge 
operating under the Justice Safety Valve Act must notify the 
prosecution in advance and explain the sentencing in writing, 
permitting the prosecutor to appeal the judge’s sentencing decision.183  
Ideally, in practice, this bill will create the checks and balances that 
justice demands. 
Another proposed bill is the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2017, which 
aims to alter the existing federal drug sentencing process in five notable 
ways.184  First, the bill will reduce overly punitive minimum sentences 
from the current “20-year, 10-year, and 5-year mandatory minimum 
drug sentences to 10, 5, and 2 years, respectively.”185 Next, the bill will 
“reduce[] the mandatory minimum life without parole sentence for a 
third drug offense to a minimum term of 25 years.”186  Third, for 
individuals who are prosecuted for playing a “limited role” in drug 
distribution (i.e. only carrying or transporting drugs), the mandatory 
sentence will be cut in half.187  Fourth, the bill will expand the federal 
drug “safety valve” by applying it to those offenders with three or fewer 
criminal history points rather than the current one criminal history 
point.188  Finally, this bill would make the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
apply retroactively, reducing the jail-time of offenders prosecuted for 
crack cocaine prior to 2010 and allowing those who have already served 
more time than the new mandatory minimums the option to petition for 
                                                          
182.  Id.; see also 159 CONG. REC. 6004 (2013).  When this bill was first 
introduced in 2013, Sen. Leahy noted that a survey by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission revealed nearly 70% of the 600 Federal district court judges “agreed the 
existing safety value provision should be extended to all Federal offenses.” Id.   
183.  Id.  
184.  Smarter Sentencing, supra note 122.  
185.  Id. 
186.  Id.  
187.  Id.  
188.  Id. The “safety valve” is a sentencing relief tool used that limits the use of 
mandatory minimum sentences related to drug offenses when the defendant does not 
have any history of violence, only one criminal history point, played a minor role in 
the offense, and the offense did not result in serious bodily injury or death. Id. 
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release.189  This proposed change under the Smarter Sentencing Act is 
important because the current, non-retroactive application of the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 violates the Equal Protection Clause.  It is 
undisputed the pre-2010 crack laws were racially discriminatory.190 
Therefore, offenders who were sentenced prior to 2010 are currently 
serving more time simply because of the date they were sentenced.  As 
a result, in practice the Act is perpetuating the very injustice it sought 
to correct.  Additionally, the  Smarter Sentencing Act has the potential 
to save more than $11 billion over a twenty-year period,191 yet this bill 
continues to die because leaders do not want to appear “soft on 
crime.”192 However, these leaders confuse the meaning of integrity by 
doing the wrong thing (voting in opposition to a bill even though it 
makes sense fiscally and morally) because everyone is looking (afraid 
their “tough on crime” favored constituents will not reelect a 
representative who voted in favor of a crack sentence reduction).193 
                                                          
189.  Id. 
190.  See id. (noting the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 attempts to redress the 
crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparities). 
191.  Potential Impact & Cost Savings: The Smarter Sentencing Act, FAMM, 
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/SSA-Impact-DOJ-Cost-Savings-Estimate-
2.pdf (reporting the cost savings would be $11,268,610,553) (last visited Dec. 3, 
2018).  
192.  James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Why Criminal Justice Reform May 
Actually Get Done This Year- if These Two Hurdles Can Be Overcome, WASH. POST 




193.  See id. Despite broad support, the bill was not brought to the floor for a 
vote. Republication majority house leader, Mitch McConnell, was concerned that if 
Republicans voted on sentencing reform close to an election there could be 
Republican colleagues in Congress who would be vulnerable to their constituents. See 
generally id. (noting whether the bill will have a chance to be passed “depends on 
Mitch McConnell deciding to bring the bill up for consideration”).  For further support 
of this point, the First Step Act passed in the House by a 360–59 vote on May 22, 
2018.  H. ROLL CALL VOTE ON H.R. 5682 (May 22, 2018), https://www.congress. 
gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5682/all-actions? overview=closed&q=%7B%22 
roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D.  The First Step Act is a prison and sentencing 
reform bill that corrects some of the misguided policies discussed in this comment.  
President Trump, Republication and Democrat leaders, and liberal reform 
organizations have been pressuring McConnell to bring the bill to the Senate floor for 
a vote before the current term ends in the next couple of weeks.  However, McConnell 
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Moreover, another proposed bill is the Sentencing Reform and 
Corrections Act, which has been proposed numerous times.194 Like the 
Smarter Sentencing Act, this bill lowers mandatory sentences for drug 
convictions, broadens the safety valve exception, and makes the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive.195  Although this bill “has 
significant bipartisan support”,196 it is likely to be struck down again.  
Although the bill was favorable in the Senate Judicial Committee with 
a sixteen to five vote,197 it is not likely to receive the support required 
for a majority vote on the floor.198  Each time the Sentencing Reform 
and Corrections Act has been presented to the floor for a vote, it has 
failed for the same reasons.199 During a Committee vote in February of 
                                                          
received pressure from a Republican Senator who is “the leader of a small but power 
block of conservatives deeply opposed to any sentencing changes.”  See Nicholas 
Fandos, McConnell Feels the Heat From the Right to Bring Criminal Justice Bill to a 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/ 
grassley-mcconnell-criminal-justice-bill.html. McConnell said that there will likely 
not be enough time left in the term to get to a vote.  Consequently, there was fear the 
bill would not pass in the new Democratic House majority if it was tabled until the 
next term.  Id.  At the time of this comment’s publication, the Senate ultimately 
approved the First Step Act on December 18, 2018 with an 87-12 vote, which the 
House ratified on December 20, with a vote of 358 to 36; on December 21, President 
Trump signed the First Step Act into law.  Erin McCarthy Holliday, President Trump 
signs criminal justice reform First Step Act into law, JURIST (Dec. 21, 2018, 03:30 
PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/12/president-trump-signs-criminal-justice-
reform-first-step-act-into-law/. 
194. S. 1917, 115th Cong. (2107).  
195. S. 1917: Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017 (115th Congress), 
FAMM (April 27, 2018), https://famm.org/s-1917-sentencing-reform-corrections-
act-2017-115th-congress/. 
196.  Prepared Statement from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman Senate 
Judiciary Comm. on Exec. Bus. Meeting 3 (Feb. 2018), https://www.judiciary. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/02-15-18%20Grassley%20Statement.pdf. 
197.  S. 1917: Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017 (115th 
Congress), supra note 196. 
198.  Executive Business Meeting on S. 1917 Sentencing Reform and 
Corrections Act of 2017, S. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG. (Feb. 5, 2018) 
(statement of Sen. Cruz, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary at 01:56:54) [hereinafter 
Statement of Sen. Cruz], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/ 
executive-business-meeting (noting that it is unclear whether the Sentencing Reform 
and Corrections Act will become a law). 
199.  Id. at 01:57:10; see generally Dara Lind, The Criminal Justice Bill 
Bringing President Obama and the Koch Brothers Together, Explained, VOX (Oct. 
19, 2015, 3:36 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/10/1/9432017/sentencing-reform-
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2018, an amendment to the bill was proposed; this amendment, if 
accepted, would result in the changes needed to win the vote of the 
members in the Senate who historically opposed the bill.200 However, 
the Committee was unwilling to concede on the parts of the bill the 
amendment sought, and consequently, voted down the amendment.201  
As a result of the Committee striking down the amendment, the benefits 
of the bill will never be realized and the same members in the Senate 
are likely to vote the bill down on the floor, putting the bill against 
greater odds in the future.202 In response to disappointment for 
“proposed legislation [that did] not go further,” President Obama said, 
“better is good” because often good portions of legislation will survive 
and get passed into law.203 Better is progress—which criminal justice 
reform desperately needs. 
B.  Emphasis on Rehabilitating the Offender While Incarcerated 
A vital step towards increasing public safety and decreasing 
incarcerations costs is rehabilitating offenders while they are 
incarcerated —”an investment in public safety that benefits all 
communities and taxpayers.”204  It is important to reflect on the value 
of implementing policies that ensure the successful re-entry of the 96% 
of federal prisoners who will eventually integrate back into society.205 
Currently, nearly half of federal prisoners are rearrested within eight 
years of their release for a new crime or rearrested for a violation of 
supervised release.206 Increasing the number and accessibility of 
                                                          
corrections-act (noting “the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act may not get 
passed at all”). 
200.  Statement of Sen. Cruz, supra note 198, at 01:58:04. 
201.  See generally Statement of Sen. Cruz, supra note 198. 
202.  Id.  
203.  Obama, supra note 3, at 828.  
204.  Kevin Ring & Molly Gill, Using Time to Reduce Crime: Federal Prisoner 
Survey Results Show Ways to Reduce Recidivism, FAMM 3 (June 2017), 
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Prison-Report_May-31_Final.pdf (noting this 
“investment is wasted if prisoners are kept in prison so long that incarceration 
becomes counterproductive, weakening family ties and causing social and job skills 
to atrophy”). 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id.  
33
Nettles: The Sobering Failure of America's "War on Drugs":  Free the P.O.W
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
FINAL Nettles camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:26 AM 
308 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
rehabilitation programs will initially result in an increase in cost.207  
However, this initial cost is far less than the consequences of releasing 
non-rehabilitated offenders back into society. Rehabilitation programs 
are a way to decrease recidivism and deter offenders from committing 
crimes in the future. 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently operates a Residential 
Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”), which was created to lower the 
probability of recidivism and decrease prison misconduct by helping 
prisoners gain the tools for crime relapse prevention.208  RDAP is 
operated under a “modified therapeutic community model” where the 
“participants live in separate housing units.”209  Inmates are motivated 
to enroll in RDAP because of incentives like a ten-month sentence 
reduction upon successful completion of the program.210  However, a 
recent study of federal prison inmates revealed that many inmates 
cannot get into the program because of the strict eligibility requirements 
and lengthy waiting list.211 For example, to qualify for the program the 
prisoner must have a history of substance abuse, 24 months or less of 
their sentence remaining, and no violent crime history or an 
immigration detainer.212 A more effective policy would apply to all 
inmates who have substance abuse problems and would incentivize 
inmates to participate, so more inmates can benefit from this treatment 
and receive the help they need while they are in prison. This would 
result in fewer relapses, lower recidivism, and less burden on the 
already overwhelmed system. 
C.  Criminal Justice Reform Results in the States 
[O]ver the past decade, many states—including so-called “red 
states” like Georgia, Texas, and Alabama—have led and 
innovated with new approaches. By reducing sentences and 
                                                          
207.  See id. at 20. 
208.  Id. at 13.  
209.  Id. at 11 (defining “modified therapeutic community model” as a separate 
housing unit where participants spend half of the day in the program and the other half 
in work, school, or vocational training).  
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. (noting that in 2016 “more than 5,000 people were waiting to enter the 
program”). 
212.  Id.  
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reinvesting some of the savings in other public safety 
initiatives—especially programs that actually address substance 
abuse and support for those with mental illness—these states 
have improved outcomes, enhanced trust, and thus ultimately 
made better use of taxpayer dollars.213 
Some states have implemented novel practices to reduce their 
prison populations and have seen a decrease in crime rates, while saving 
money.214 For example, South Carolina, Iowa, Massachusetts and 
Georgia have significantly decreased drug sentences, “reduc[ing] 
prison populations and increase[ing] public safety.”215  “[T]he 
American Law Institute has made diversion and deferred adjudication 
part of its Model Penal Code: Sentencing project,” and many states have 
explored alternatives to conviction.216 
Many states have started to change the felony requirements for theft 
charges by increasing the property value for felony theft, which keeps 
low-level offenders out of prison.217 For example, in California, the 
dollar amount of stolen property amounting to felony theft is $950.218  
By contrast, in Florida, the dollar amount for a theft to be a felony is 
only $300.219  The minimum penalty for a felony conviction is one year 
in prison, which costs the state $30,621 annually per inmate.220  This 
cost is hard to justify, especially when studies show there is no deterrent 
effect from raising the felony theft threshold.221  In the states that have 
increased the requirements for what amounts to a felony, there has been 
no increase in property crime or larceny.222  In fact, those states have 
                                                          
213.  Obama, supra note 3, at 821.  
214.  See The Justice Safety Valve Act: S. 1127/H.R. 2435 (115th Congress), 
supra note 181, (reporting the results in over thirty states who have reformed or 
eliminated their mandatory sentencing laws in the last thirty years have been increased 
public safety and reduced prison populations).  
215.  Id. 
216.  PAG, supra note 151, at 9. 
217.  See Alan Greenblatt, What Counts as a Felony? For Stealing, States are 
Raising the Bar, GOVERNING (Mar. 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-
justice-safety/gov-theft-felony.html.  
218.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West 2018). 
219.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014 (West 2018). 
220.  See JAMES, supra note 177, at 9. 
221.  See Greenblatt, supra note 217. 
222.  Id.  
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seen crime rates decrease at a similar rate to states that have not changed 
their theft laws.223 
This is one area where states and the federal government can 
improve. A cost-benefit analysis could be used to determine what 
penalty would make the most sense when considering (1) the cost of the 
damage caused by the crime and (2) the proportionate penalty available 
for the damage caused. Also, considering most thefts are committed to 
get money for drugs, mandating an offender in this category to a 
rehabilitation program, instead of prison, could be a better option.224  
Rehabilitation accomplishes two things: (1) crime control is 
accomplished by eliminating the offender’s motivation for committing 
the crime (i.e. buying or selling drugs), and (2) taxpayers are saved 
$30,621 in misspent funds penalizing a crime that cost the community 
$300.225 
V.  ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 
As discussed above, the certainty of punishment is a deterrent 
effect, not the severity of punishment. The United States Attorneys’ 
Manual, the Criminal Justice Section Committee on Sentencing, and the 
American Bar Association expressly suggest using an alternative to 
incarceration for low-risk offenders who pose no substantial threat to 
the community because their crimes involve substance abuse and 
mental illness.226  Despite the low cost and decreased recidivism rates, 
only “twenty-two of the ninety-six federal districts” have implemented 
“alternative to incarceration programs.”227  Within this small number of 
federal districts using alternatives to incarceration, only first-time or 
low-level offenders are eligible for these programs.228 Further, 
diversion programs have shown a decrease in recidivism among 
                                                          
223.  Id. 
224.  See Addiction, Substance Use and the Justice System, supra note 2 (finding 
many inmates committed crimes to obtain money for drugs). 
225.  See JAMES, supra note 177, at 4, 9 (“Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy (WSIPP) suggests that effective rehabilitation programs can result in cost 
savings.”). 
226.  See PAG, supra note 151, at 16 n.37, 16 n.39. 
227.  Id. at 17.  
228.  Id. at 16–17. 
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program participants,229 suggesting diversion programs are how 
certainty of punishment has been successfully been put into practice. 
The districts utilizing diversion programs have over 70% of 
participants successfully completing the programs, saving the district 
over $3 million in incarceration costs.230  Also, these “programs [have] 
reduced costs that are more difficult to quantify”, such as loss of 
employment, recidivism, and a loss of a sense of community.231  The 
goal of these programs is to give first time offenders an opportunity to 
avoid a conviction.  Instead of a conviction, offenders are required to 
stay drug and alcohol free for at least a twelve-month period, 
successfully complete the program, and attend monthly meetings with 
pre-trial services.232  If an offender meets the criteria, the conviction is 
often suspended or avoided altogether.233  Additionally, these programs 
have substantial support from those in the legal community 
demonstrating the popularity and success of implementing alternative 
options to incarceration.234 
Drug courts are another substitute to incarceration and are designed 
to help relieve the overburdened criminal courts with drug-addicted 
defendants.235  Drug courts have been praised for shifting the punitive 
criminal penalties to a rehabilitative focus for drug-addicted 
defendants.236  Unlike diversion programs, offenders usually cannot 
avoid conviction of the offense, but they can avoid incarceration.237  In 
drug courts, offenders can avoid incarceration by following the strict 
rules of the program, meeting with the probation officer regularly, and 
                                                          
229.  Id. at 18.  
230.  Id.  
231.  Id.  
232.  See id. at 17–18. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. at 19. 
235.  See Molly K. Webster, Alternative Courts and Drug Treatment: Finding 
a Rehabilitative Solution for Addicts in a Retributive System, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
855, 857–58 (2015) (finding the success of rehabilitation programs is measured by a 
reduction in recidivism rates). 
236.  Id. at 858. 
237.  Webster, supra note 235, at 18; see generally Drug Court: Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 179 (“The program includes frequent random drug 
testing, judicial supervision, drug treatment counseling, educational and vocational 
training opportunities, and the use of court-imposed sanctions and incentives.”).  
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abstaining from drugs and alcohol.238  The defendant is aware of the 
certainty that upon production of a positive drug test, he or she will be 
immediately taken into custody.239  Each time the defendant provides a 
positive drug test, the periods of incarceration get increasingly more 
punitive.240  The certainty of punishment makes these programs 
successful, along with their ability to provide defendants with 
rehabilitative treatment.  This certainty of consequences is also a reason 
why probation sentences are an effective tool.  When an individual is 
on probation substantial restrictions are placed on their liberty, which 
may include home detention, community confinement, and community 
service; if these restrictions are not followed the person is at risk of 
imprisonment for a minor technical violation.241 Placing more non-
violent offenders on probation, in diversion programs, and in drugs 
courts more effectively fulfills the purpose of sentencing, decreases 
incarceration costs, and provides offenders with the tools to become 
independent from the criminal justice system. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
“Just punishment” should be defined by the empirical evidence 
produced by the Sentencing Commission and what the public 
supports.242 Rehabilitation, mental health treatment, drug treatment, 
probation, and community service are preferred over incarceration.243 
The United States has taken an extreme punitive approach to effectuate 
crime control.  This approach is ineffective and does not reduce crime.  
Instead, crime rates are unaffected by harsher penalties, but the prison 
system consumes government funds and resources while doing little to 
                                                          
238.  Drug Court: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 179. 
239.  See generally id.  
240.  Id. at 4. 
241.  Id. 
242.  Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (And A Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1017, 1018 (2004) (“On the dimension of just punishment, the Guidelines generally 
track social norms (for example, public opinion) by providing prison sentences that 
are consistent with the public’s view of appropriate punishment.”).  
243.  See Myths and Facts: Why Incarceration is Not the Best Way to Keep 
Communities Safe, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS 8 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws. 
com/static.nicic.gov/Library/032698.pdf.  
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help rehabilitate those incarcerated.  We must pass fairer, smarter, more 
effective sentencing policies.  The Smarter Sentencing Act was first 
introduced in 2013, then in 2014, and again in 2015,244 to no avail. 
However, the data from states that have implemented alternative 
options to incarceration continue to increase and expand, proving these 
policies are fiscally, socially, and morally beneficial. The success of 
these states is a result of decreasing penalties and shifting costs to 
rehabilitative services and community resources. 
One federal district judge wrote to the Chairman of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, “In the pursuit of treating people equally, we 
have overdone it to the point where the cure is worse than the 
disease.”245 Too much is expected out of the criminal justice system. 
Crime control is better situated with an increased focus on education,246 
                                                          
244.  See generally S. 1933, 115th Cong. (2017). 
245.  Stephen S. Trott, Letter to Chairman of U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(November 9, 1994), reprinted in Federal Sentencing Reporter 8 (1995). In his letter 
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1994, Hon. Stephen Trott expresses his 
frustration with the overly complicated guideline structure and emphatically requests 
that there be three changes made that would reduce the number of considerations that 
go into a final sentence, give the sentencing judge broader discretion, and reduce the 
number of appeals. See id.  
246.  Alma Gonzalez, Education: The Secret to Crime Reduction? 12, 15 
(Spring 2015) (unpublished International Relations Thesis, New York University), 
https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/politics/documents/Gonzalez.pdf (noting that 
a 1% increase in high school graduation rates correlates to a 4.26% decrease in the 
homicide rate and finding violent crime rates decrease significantly as higher levels 
of educational attainment are obtained); see also 161 CONG. REC. 5025 (2015) 
(Montana Senator Jon Tester remarks on the Every Child Achieves Act, “Nearly 
80[%] of the male inmates in Montana’s prison system are high school dropouts . . . 
Nearly three-quarters of the women in Montana jails are high school dropouts.  
Superintendent Juneau estimated that Montana could combine crime reduction 
savings and additional revenue of over $19 million annually if we just graduated 5% 
more kids and incarcerated fewer of them.  Nationally, . . . over 80[%] of the 
incarcerated population is high school drop outs.”).   
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jobs,247 strong family units,248 mental health availability,249 detoxes and 
drug abuse treatment centers. The current approach to control crime is 
to punish the offender after the offense, rather than mitigating the 
factors that lead to offenders committing crime in the first place. 
Imposing harsh penalties that do nothing to alleviate the number of 
people who get entangled in the criminal justice system is not an 
effective approach to meet sentencing goals.  If we allow the evidence 
and data to drive our policy decisions, we have a fighting chance at 
winning the “War on Drugs.” 
Meagan K. Nettles* 
 
                                                          
247.  Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of 
Unemployment on Crime, 44 J. L. & ECON. 259, 261 (2001) (observing property crime 
rates increase when unemployment rates increase).  
248.  Patrick F. Fagan & Aaron Churchill, The Effects of Divorce on Children, 
MARRIAGE & RELIGION RES. INST. 35 (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.frc.org/EF/EF12 
A22.pdf (noting in “Wisconsin incarceration rates of juvenile delinquents was 12 
times higher among children of divorced parents than among children of married 
parents”).  
249.  Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Texas, 1999) (“It is 
deplorable and outrageous that this state’s prisons appear to have become a repository 
for a great number of its mentally ill citizens. Persons who, with psychiatric care, 
could fit well into society, are instead locked away, to become wards of the state’s 
penal system. Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they may be confined to conditions 
that nurture, rather than abate, their psychoses.”). 
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